I’ve written several times recently to argue that the United States should review the terrorism designation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and consider removing the group from American terrorist lists. After all, the PKK—or its various proxy groups and affiliates—have never targeted Americans. Indeed, while the United States labeled them a terrorist group largely out of deference to Turkey at a time when Turkey was still an ally in both name and deed, the listing may have been unfair: the PKK arguably engaged more in insurgency than terrorism over the past quarter century. Regardless, the situation has changed significantly in recent years, both in terms of Turkish actions and PKK deeds. Turkey is now much more of a terror sponsor than the PKK ever was, turning a blind eye to if not directly supporting the Islamic State (ISIS) by enabling transit, providing medical care, and apparently offering resupply. Turkey also supports Hamas; Hamas operatives inside Turkey have planned several recent attempted Hamas terrorist strikes in Israel. The Turkish ambassador to Chad even went so far as to endorse on twitter Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the wake of that group’s rampage in northern Mali.
The PKK, meanwhile, has promoted and accepted a ceasefire with Turkey and is actively engaged in peace talks. Indeed, in these talks, it has been Turkey and not the PKK that has failed to deliver on its promise. The PKK did the lion’s share to liberate Sinjar from the Islamic State (ISIS) and it also has the best track record on the ground both against the Syrian regime and against ISIS. PKK affiliates control more ground inside Syria than the Free Syrian Army, and are far more moderate: When I visited “Rojava,” as the Kurdish-controlled zone in Syria is called, municipal services functioned, girls walked to school alone, and Christians, Muslims, and Yezidis; Kurds and Arabs lived and worshipped side by side with equal rights under the law.
Both PKK activists and many more Kurds at large believe that there should be no question about the United States coming around and embracing the PKK. But, re-evaluation should not be a one-way street. The PKK began as a Marxist organization, motivated as much by the fight against capitalism as it was by Kurdish nationalism. When, a year ago, I attended as an observer a PKK rally in Paris at the invitation of some Kurdish leaders, many marched under Kurdish flags, but other embraced the hammer and sickle, or visages of Che Guevara. Those embracing Guevara flags might think of him as a force of resistance against oppressive powers, but much of the world knows Guevara as a psychopathic mass murder. To embrace Che Guevara, or march under symbols of a movement responsible for the slaughter of tens of millions of people in the twentieth century, is not the way to win hearts and minds of mainstream American or European society. To their credit, Kurdish leaders listened to my concerns and responded—rightly—that such flags were in the minority and that they can hardly control who brings what banners and placards to a rally. But, still, if the fight is about Kurdish rights and cultural freedoms, then its association with radical leftism is only going to detract from an otherwise worthy agenda.
Many Kurds also look at imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan as a new Nelson Mandela. There are parallels: Both engaged in armed struggle and terrorism only to preach peace in their later career. Kurds expect that Öcalan will eventually be released from prison and can take up a mantle of leadership much like Mandela did. But where the two diverge is with regard to the cult of personality that surrounds them. South Africans embraced Mandela, but Mandela placed democracy and rule-of-law above his person. Indeed, his wife Winnie Mandela discovered that being the family of the president did not mean being above the law. It is unfair to judge Öcalan before his release from prison, but he appears to continue to encourage a personality cult which suggests disinterest in making good on rhetoric of democracy and individual freedom. Iraqi Kurds did not win freedom after Saddam’s fall; they simply replaced the Iraqi dictator’s portrait with one of their own. The Turkish and Syrian Kurds need not repeat that experience, and should realize that dictators’ portraits can be removed rather than replaced.
The PKK is still in crisis mode, and rightly so. It or its affiliates are under siege in Syria, Turkey, and Iran, and its leader in prison. But, not since the immediate aftermath of World War I have the stars aligned for a favorable resolution to the Kurdish cause as they do now. It is always easy to use crises as excuses not to reform, but if the PKK is serious about democracy, it must demand freedom and liberty not only for Kurds broadly, but it must also preach and practice democracy for Kurds within its hierarchy.
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